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ABSTRACT Many web-based attacks have been studied to understand how web hackers behave, but web
site defacement attacks (malicious content manipulations of victim web sites) and defacers’ behaviors have
received less attention from researchers. This paper fills this research gap via a computational data-driven
analysis of a public database of defacers and defacement attacks and activities of 96 selected defacers who
were active on Twitter. We conducted a comprehensive analysis of the data: an analysis of a friendship
graph with 10,360 nodes, an analysis on how sentiments of defacers related to attack patterns, and a
topical modelling based analysis to study what defacers discussed publicly on Twitter. Our analysis revealed
a number of key findings: a modular and hierarchical clustering method can help discover interesting
sub-communities of defacers; sentiment analysis can help categorize behaviors of defacers in terms of
attack patterns; and topic modelling revealed some focus topics (politics, country-specific topics, and
technical discussions) among defacers on Twitter and also geographic links of defacers sharing similar topics.
We believe that these findings are useful for a better understanding of defacers’ behaviors, which could help
design and development of better solutions for detecting defacers and even preventing impeding defacement
attacks.
INDEX TERMS Cyber attacks, defacers, defacement, graph-based analysis, hacking, hackers, online social
networks, natural language processing, NLP, OSN, sentiment analysis, social media, topic modeling, Twitter.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cybercrime such as hacking activities of cyber criminals
have been causing a significant amount of damage to their
victims (organizations and people) [1], and such threats are
becoming more and more advanced and severe in recent
years [2]. A lot of research has been conducted for a better
understanding, detection and prevention of cybercrime and
behaviors of cyber criminals and victims. Some studies on
cybercrime have a technical focus, but others are more social
science research in fields such as criminology, psychology,
and economics.
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and
approving it for publication was Chao Shen .
Most technical research work focuses on automatic
detection and prevention of cyber attacks and attackers
(e.g., intrusion detection [3], anti-malware techniques [4],
and anti-phishing solutions [5]), and forensic analysis of
cyber security incidents to facilitate investigation of cyber
attacks [6]. On the other hand, studies in social sciences
mostly focuses on understanding motivations and modus
operandi of cyber attackers, legal contexts of cyber attacks,
or estimate social effects of cyber attacks to victims and the
society at large. For instance, Gandhi et al. proposed to cat-
egorize cyber attacks into four groups based based on moti-
vations of human attackers [7]: politically motivated attacks,
socio-cultural conflict triggered attacks, economically moti-
vated attacks, and espionage related attacks. Another example
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is Yang et al.’s work [8], which studied social relationships in
hacker communities to understand how they acted on online
social media, using Twitter as an example platform.
We have seen few studies bridging social and technical
aspects of cyber attacks using computational methods to
study activities, behaviors and organizational aspects of hack-
ing communities, often using data from open and dark web.
Among such research, much has been done by analyzing
data from online social networks (OSNs) such as Twitter and
underground forums [8]–[15].
Although there has been a lot of research conducted on
different cyber attacks, one common type of cyber attack
has received relatively less attention from researchers – web
site defacement attacks. This type of attacks are among the
most common web attacks and frequently reported by the
media. For instance, just to give one such example reported
recently, a hacking group, Ghost Squad Hackers,1 defaced the
website of European Space Agency (ESA) twice, on 14 and
19 July 2020 [16], [17]. Particularly, to the best of our
knowledge, there have no previous attempts on analyzing
defacers’ behaviors based on OSN data. See Section II for a
more detailed literature review on relatedwork on defacement
attacks and defacers.
This paper reports our efforts in filling the gap of
OSN-based behavioral analysis of defacers to enhance the
existing body of knowledge about defacement attacks and
defacers, which could help design and development of better
solutions for detecting defacers and even preventing imped-
ing defacement attacks.
Our work is based on a computational data-driven analysis
of a public database of defacers and defacement attacks and
activities of 96 selected defacers who were active on Twitter.
Our analysis revealed a number of key findings: a modular
and hierarchical clustering method can help discover interest-
ing sub-communities of defacers; sentiment analysis can help
categorize behaviors of defacers in terms of attack patterns;
and topic modelling revealed some focus topics (politics,
country-specific topics, and technical discussions) among
defacers on Twitter and also geographic links of defacers
sharing similar topics.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Related
work about defacers and defacement attacks is summarized in
Section II. We explain our main research questions (RQs) and
the method used to study the RQs in Section III, and the data
we used in Section IV. Our analysis methods and the results
are elaborated in Section V. Lastly, the paper is concluded by
Section VI, with some future work discussed.
II. RELATED WORK
Defacement attacks have been frequently reported, and there
have been a number of public archiving and mirroring
web sites of actual defacement attacks. One of the most
well-knownweb sites of this kind is Zone-H,2 which has been
1This particular hacking group is captured in our later analysis.
2http://www.zone-h.org/
widely used in studies of defacement attacks and defacers.
Mirror-H3 is another similar web site, and according to Alexa
it was the website with the highest overlap of audience with
Zone-H.4 Yet another such web site is H@CK M1RROR,5
but this web site has not been updated since 2017, so the
data become quite out-dated. Such defacement archiving and
mirroring websites mostly depend on self-reported attacks by
defacers themselves.
Automatic detection of web site defacement attacks have
been studied by many researchers, typically using machine
learning techniques [18]–[22]. Most of such studies are based
on textual analysis of the web site contents, but there has been
some work exploring image-based analysis using computer
vision techniques without prior knowledge of the target web
site’s original content [23].
A lot of socio-technical work in this area focuses on under-
standing the motivations of defacers. For instance, Woo et al.
used the content of defaced web sites to infer psychological
motivations of defacers [24]. They used several psychological
and social theories and concludedwith two groups: pranksters
and militants. They classified 70% of the defacement activi-
ties they examined as done by pranksters. They also argued
that although a majority of defacers were pranksters, their
defacement activities were not harmless. In addition, they
reported that unlike the general belief about hackers often
being ‘‘sole wolves’’, they seemed to have existed in a social
community of hackers.
In 2017 Romagna et al. studied the connection between
hacktivism and defacement attacks [25], where they investi-
gated the reasons (or motivations) behind defacement attacks.
For that, they collected data from Zone-H for 12 months.
Interviews with some of the defacers from that period were
also conducted. They noticed that Zone-H data included
some tags referring to the reasons of the recorded deface-
ment attacks, and analyzed such tags statistically. Most of
the defacement attacks were tagged using ‘‘Heh. . . just for
fun’’. Romagna et al. observed that hacktivists had generally
displayed socio-political contents on the defaced web sites.
They argued that most hacktivists had been motivated by
socio-political matters, often linked with regional or interna-
tional tensions. Another conclusion drawn from their study
is that defacers sought attention and therefore used archiving
web sites like Zone-H to make their activities public.
Romagna et al.’s work depended on tags on Zone-H to
analyze the motivations of defacers. This approach was chal-
lenged by Maggi et al. in 2018 [26]. They argued that it
is untrustworthy to rely on such tags because they can be
forged easily. Following a different approach, Maggi et al.
studied defacement campaigns by examining the contents of
the actual defaced web sites. They stated that using actual
content of defaced web sites is more reliable than using meta-
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a topical modeling tool to study the shift of defacement topics
over time. They conducted both dynamic (in web browser)
and static (on hard disk) analysis on the defaced web sites
to extract features, which were then normalization, clustered
and visualized for studying different defacement campaigns
over time. They studied both lone defacers and hackers who
cooperated with each other. One interesting observation they
reported is that the use of Twitter as a contact information was
on the rise, whereas e-mail usage was decreasing.
In 2019 Howell et al. [28] studied hackers’ valuation of
potential targets, particularly focusing on how cyber attacks
targeted different nations. They tried to understand why hack-
ers chose their targets and if it has something to do with the
guardianship level of the victim. They based their work on
the routine activity theory, which introduces three aspects for
victimization: convergence of motivated offenders, suitable
targets, and the lack of adequate guardianship. Based on
information collected from various sources including Zone-H
(for defacement attacks), statistics about 114 nations and their
development levels, they reported that there is a strong con-
nection between the level of a nation’s overall guardianship
and the rate of attacks targeting that nation: more capable
nations received less attacks.
Surprisingly, although a lot of work has been done on
usingOSNdata to analyze activities and behaviors of hackers,
cyber criminals and other types of cyber attackers [8]–[15],
[29], [30], there has been very limited research on using OSN
data to study defacement attacks and defacers. The only work
we are aware of was done by Maimon et al. in 2017 [31].
They used data from Zone-H and 187 accounts on multiple
OSN platforms including Twitter, Facebook and YouTube
to study if defacement attacks and defacers’ activities on
those OSNs are related. They found that the active use of
OSNs was correlated with a high frequency of defacement
attacks. They also reported that if an attacker used both
Twitter and Facebook this increased defacement attacks on
non-USA targets while Twitter-only account usage yielded a
high number of attacks against USA-based web sites. This
study however was based on a relatively small dataset on
Zone-H (May-July 2017) and only some limited aspect of
defacers’ activities on OSNs were studied. Our work reported
in this paper is more comprehensive in both breadth and
depth.
III. RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND METHOD
Considering the lack of past studies investigating connections
between defacement attacks and activities of defacers on
OSNs, we decided to conduct a more comprehensive analysis
of defacers’ activities on Twitter and how they are connected
with actual defacement attacks. We chose to focus on Twitter
because it was the OSN platform increasingly used by defac-
ers as reported by Maggi et al.’s research in 2018 [26].
This work’s overall aim is to find out how defacers’ activ-
ities on Twitter can help us better understand behaviors of
defacers. We set three separate RQs for our study:
• RQ1: Canwe study the social structure of defacers based
on the data on Twitter?
• RQ2: Can we connect publicly visible sentiment of
defacers on Twitter with defacement attacks they
launched?
• RQ3: What topics did defacers talk about on Twitter and
how are they related to the motivation of defacement
attacks?
To study all RQs, we needed to identify a number defacers
who were / are active on Twitter. We explain how such
defacers and their Twitter accounts were identified in the next
section. After identifying selected defacers’ Twitter accounts,
we proceeded to collect data about their activities on Twitter
and also defacement attacks attributed to them.
Based on the data we collected, we studied RQ1 using
the friendship graphs of selected defacers’ Twitter accounts,
and applied unsupervised clustering methods to identify
sub-communities within those defacers and their friends.
Social structures were then studied around such sub-
communities. For RQ2, we applied natural language pro-
cessing (NLP) based sentiment analysis of defacers’ activ-
ities on Twitter, and compared the results with the actual
attacks launched, which led to the discovery of different
sentiment-attack patterns. Such patterns can be explained by
different motivations of defacers. For RQ3, we used the NLP
based topical modeling method LDA to analyze discussions
of defacers in order to understand what topics they were dis-
cussing, focusing on common topics shared among different
sub-communities of defacers.
IV. DATA USED
To study the research questions listed in the previous section,
we first collected defacement attacks and their details such
as dates of occurrence and the defacers responsible for such
attacks. Such data are needed to identify defacers and their
Twitter accounts. Once we had Twitter accounts of some
defacers, we collected those accounts’ profiles and timelines,
and constructed their friendship graphs, for further analysis.
In the following, we explain the two different sets of data used
in greater details.
A. DEFACEMENT DATA
We used the defacement archiving web sites Zone-H and
Mirror-H to collect data needed for our analysis. The reason
for choosing Zone-H is its popularity among the hacker com-
munity and researchers who have studied defacement attacks
and defacers [18], [21], [23]–[26], [28], [31]. Mirror-H was
used to increase the size and diversity of our data. We decided
not to use H@CKM1RROR since the data on that website is
mostly out-dated.
These sources were used in two different ways. Firstly,
we crawled defacement attacks (including the mirror web
pages of the defaced web sites) from both web sites to collect
names of the likely responsible defacers (notifier in Zone-
H, attacker in Mirror-H). For Mirror-H and Zone-H we used
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different ways to crawl the data. For Mirror-H, the data was
collected crawled by a cyber security firm. They crawled the
‘‘Archive’’ page of Mirror-H6 from January to July in 2019.
They kindly shared their data for academic purposes. For
Zone-H, we could not find a collaborative firm so we crawled
the website ourselves by collecting defacement attacks on the
‘‘Special Defacement Archive’’ page of the website7 between
December 2018 to March 2019. As neither web sites required
user registration to post defacement attacks, there were a lot
of unusable hacker names in our initial collection. A cleaning
process was therefore applied to the initial collection by
eliminating some obviously unreliable names such as too
long entries, entries with many punctuation marks, entries
with incremental names (e.g., WSO-01, WSO-02). At the
end of the cleaning process, we obtained a list of around
2,002 defacers, which we considered more reliable.
Later on, after the extraction of defacers who existed
on Twitter (see below), corresponding defacers’ profiles on
Zone-H andMirror-H were collected. We only collected their
timelines and crawling took place between 15th of August to
15th of October 2019. The timelines were collected up to the
3,200 tweets limit set by the Twitter API, going back from
the crawling date. This data was used to analyze the attack
patterns of those defacers and to compare themwith defacers’
sentiments on Twitter (for RQ2).
B. TWITTER DATA
After having a more sensible list of defacers, we moved on
to check if these defacers were active on Twitter using the
Twitter API. Several approaches were attempted to check if
Twitter accounts used by those defacers existed.
The first one we attempted is using the GET users/search
Twitter API to search for possible accounts that may be
related to each defacer in our list. This Twitter API returns
up to 20 accounts per search. This approach has a downside
on the large number of candidate accounts that may have to be
checked manually. This means that we may have to manually
check up to nearly 40,000 Twitter accounts. After evaluating
the amount of manual work needed and potential human
errors that can occur in the manual process, we decided that
such a manual process is not ideal so we skipped this method.
Next, we simply assumed that some defacers used the
same name on the defacement archiving web sites and on
Twitter, i.e., the names in our list are the corresponding
Twitter handlers. By this approach 557 Twitter accounts were
detected and 56 of themwere protected accounts. The remain-
ing 449 accounts were subjected to timeline filtering using
keywords (hacker, zone-h, mirror-h, hack, deface, defaced).
The resulting 87 Twitter accounts were checked manually to
see if they indeed correspond to a defacer on the defacement
archiving web sites. This was done by looking for refer-
ences to original links to defacement pages in timelines. This
method’s main drawback is that it can miss some defacers’
6https://mirror-h.org/archive
7http://www.zone-h.org/archive/special=1
Twitter accounts if they use different names on the deface-
ment indexing web sites and on Twitter.
To further extend our list of defacers on Twitter we applied
a third method. On defacement indexing web sites there are
several information items about a specific defacement:
• Date
• Defacer (the notifier, may not be the attacker)
• Country
• URL (of the defaced web page)
• IP
• Mirror of the defaced state of URL
We looked for Twitter links in mirrors of the defaced web
sites. Indexing services takes a snapshot of the defaced state
as an HTML file. We leveraged these HTML files to look for
Twitter links. Then we checked the Twitter handles to see if
they were actually related to one or more defacers from the
defacement indexing web sites. Similar methods have been
reported in the literature, e.g., for extracting defacers’ contact
information (e-mail or Twitter) from defaced web sites [32].
After combining results from the second and the third
methods, we obtained in total 100 Twitter accounts we
believed to belong to defacers. After that, we crawled the
following information for each of the 100 Twitter accounts
for further analysis: timelines, account information, friends
(other Twitter accounts they followed). We also translated
all tweets to English using the Translate API from Yandex.8
This API was used because most other alternative solutions
we found were using Google’s previous API which was no
longer valid. Google had switched to a paid service, which
we decided to avoid using because the cost will be too high
and the performance of Yandex API is sufficiently good.
V. RESULTS
A. GRAPH-BASED SOCIAL STRUCTURE ANALYSIS
Among the 100 Twitter accounts of defacers, 4 did not have
any friends, so for this analysis we looked at the remain-
ing 96 accounts only. An initial list of the 96 accounts’
friends on Twitter was crawled, where ‘‘friends of a Twit-
ter account A’’ means other Twitter accounts A follows.
We chose only friends but not followers of the defacers’
accounts because one cannot control who would follow him-
self/herself. In addition, we also recorded friendship relation-
ships between friends of all defacers, including friendships
among nodes who do not share the same defacer(s) as friends.
The reason of including the friendships of defacers’ friends
is to allow a better coverage of the social structure of the
defacers community. At the end, we obtained a directed
friendship graph with 10,360 nodes (Twitter accounts) and
1,188,360 edges (friendships).
The resulting graph is visualized in Fig. 1.9 While the
graph shows some clear visual patterns, it is too large to allow
extraction of more concrete semantic insights.
8https://tech.yandex.com/translate/
9For all figures representing graphs, the ForceAtlas2 layout algorithm
[33] was used with the LinLog mode, Dissuade Hubs and Prevent Overlap
selections activated.
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FIGURE 1. The whole graph with 10,360 nodes. Node names are not shown since the graph is too large.
To further analyze the graph, we need to focus on smaller
sub-graphs, each of which representing a sub-community.
To this end, we decided to apply unsupervised clustering
methods because we did not have ground truth labels to train a
supervised classifier for detecting sub-communities. Several
clustering algorithms were tested, including DBSCAN [34],
Girvan-Newman clustering [35], Leiden algorithm [36], and
themodularity score optimization based clustering [37]. After
we got the clustering results, we used a prominent Turkish
hacking group, Turk Hack Team (THT), and manually iden-
tified Twitter accounts of this group as a validation dataset,
in order to estimate the performance of all the clustering
methods in terms of clustering related hackers together. This
led to the discovery that the modularity optimization based
algorithm worked the best because all the other clustering
methods failed to cluster most THT related accounts into a
single cluster. To further validate the modularity optimization
based algorithm indeed performed well, we looked at other
clusters and identified a new hacking group, Ghost Squad
Hack (GSH), as a separate cluster. This provides further
evidence that the modularity optimization based algorithm
worked well. We acknowledge that this performance evalu-
ation method is not ideal, but given the lack of ground truth
knowledge of defacers and their Twitter accounts, there was
not an alternative approach we could use.
The first application of the modularity optimization based
clustering algorithm resulted with 46 clusters (subgraphs).
Showing all the 46 clusters and reporting the analysis results
are impossible given the space limit, so we use two represen-
tative example sub-graphs to illustrate how the modularity
based clustering helped us gain some useful insights about
social structures of defacers. The first selected subgraph
includes some of the defacers from the initial list we obtained
fromZone-H andMirror-H. It has 412 nodes and 4,713 edges,
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FIGURE 2. A Turkish defacers community extracted from the initial graph
shown in Fig. 1.
as shown in Fig. 2. Examining Twitter accounts belonging
to this subgraph, we observed that this is a sub-community
whose members are mostly Turkish-speaking. We further
applied the same clustering method on this subgraph in order
to explore finer structures within this cluster, and got 5 sub-
clusters (sub-subgraphs). At this second level we started to
see more semantically interesting information about how
this cluster is formed: except one obviously uninteresting
sub-cluster with just 3 nodes, the other four sub-clusters
represent four different sub-communities (colored differently
in Fig. 2):
• Celebrities (green sub-cluster)
• Cyber security community (purple sub-cluster)
• Rapper community (orange sub-cluster)
• Politics community (blue sub-cluster)
Since we are more interested in defacers, we decided to
apply a third level of clustering to the cyber security sub-
subgraph, which we expected to include more defacers. This
sub-subgraph has 148 nodes and 1,085 edges (see Fig. 3).
After applying the same modularity optimization based clus-
tering method, we obtained a finer structure of this sub-
community, splitting into different groups of cyber security
related people and organisations. For instance, the blue clus-
ter in Fig. 3 includesmembers of the Turkish group of hackers
THT. Another example is the orange cluster, which includes
mostly cyber security professionals and organizations.
Similarly, the second selected subgraph is about another
hacking group GSH. After applying two levels of cluster-
ing like we did for the first selected subgraph, hackers
who claimed to have been hacking on behalf of GSH are
grouped together, as shown in Fig. 4. The cluster colored
FIGURE 3. A Turkish cyber community extracted from the graph shown
in Fig. 2.
FIGURE 4. The Ghost Squad Hack (GSH) community extracted from the
initial graph shown in Fig. 1.
green includes six accounts attributed to GSH (based on the
corresponding nodes’ Twitter profiles). Interestingly, most
accounts in this subgraph are not in our original list of
defacers, implying that the graph analysis could be used to
discover unknown defacers and hackers. The fact that THT
and GSH are in two different subgraphs in the first level of
clustering indicates that the clustering-based graph analysis
has the potential to separate different hacking groups and
identifying members of hacking groups.
The analysis described above shows that a hierarchical
application of the modularity optimization based clustering
method is useful to reveal social structures of the network
of defacers and their friends on Twitter. This is not surpris-
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ing since social structures are often hierarchical, therefore a
one-layered clustering cannot work well. This also suggests
that a similar approach can be used to group like-minded peo-
ple and organizations on OSNs and other online platforms.
It deserves noting that the clustering-based graph analysis
relies on active involvement of a human analyst in the process,
therefore following the human-machine teaming paradigm,
which is necessary for such complicated tasks that neither
humans or machines alone can do well. In addition to the
clustering method, graph visualization is another automated
tool helping human analysts to conduct the graph analysis.
As a whole, we can see the answer to RQ1 is positive: graph
analysis using OSN data does help us study social structure
of defacers.
B. SENTIMENT AND ATTACK FREQUENCY ANALYSIS
In this part we investigate the correlation between a defacer’s
sentiment and his/her attack frequency. For this purpose,
we crawled the timelines of Twitter accounts of the 100 defac-
ers identified. Crawling results showed that 5 of them did
not have any tweets at the time of the crawling, leaving
95 Twitter accounts and timelines for further analysis. The
crawled tweets were analyzed using TextBlob,10 a popular
NLP library written in Python on top of another widely used
NLP toolkit NLTK.11 The sentiment analysis algorithm in
TextBlob was run on each tweet. Before running the algo-
rithm all of the tweets are translated to English using the
Yandex API. This sentiment analysis implementation uses a
naive Bayes analyzer trained on a movie reviews dataset. This
may not give the best results and a more specific training
process may be more suitable, but after manually evaluating
the results on a subset of tweets we considered it good enough
for our purpose here. For each defacer, the sentiment scores
for all tweets were then grouped together to form an average
value for each day. Then such daily values and the defacer’s
daily attack frequencies obtained from Zone-H and Mirror-H
were compared and the overlapping time periods were then
extracted. As a consequence, for each day in those time
periods we have a sentiment score and an attack frequency,
which can be checked for possible correlation. Since the sen-
timent scores are between -1 and 1, to facilitate comparison
and visual presentation, we normalized attack frequencies so
that the maximum frequency per defacer (across the whole
timeline of defacement attacks attributed to each defacer) is
mapped to 1.
After getting the daily sentiment scores and attack frequen-
cies for each defacer, we examined how they are correlated
manually in a grouped bar chart. For some defacers, the over-
lap between the sentiment scores and the attack frequencies
is insufficient to make any conclusive judgments.
Out of the 95 defacers, 46 were considered to have a
sufficient level of overlap. For half (23) of the 46 defacers,
some level of correlation between the sentiment scores and
10https://textblob.readthedocs.io/en/dev/
11https://www.nltk.org/
the attack frequencies were observed (see Fig. 5 for six
representative examples). The correlation typically has a lag-
ging effect, i.e., the sentiment appeared shortly (one or a
few days) before or after the actual defacement attack(s),
and it can be either negative or positive. A sentiment status
appearing before an attack reflects the motivation (e.g., being
angry about some political news, which drives a defacer
to launch an attack) and one afterwards corresponds to the
consequence (e.g., feeling happier or less angry after launch-
ing a successful attack). Combining the temporal pattern,
the positivity and the strength of the correlation, we can infer
useful information about motivation and attitude of defacers.
What is the most interesting is that such a correlation pattern
can be repeatedly observed for some defacers (e.g., Defacers
#2 and #3 in Fig. 5), implying that it would be possible
to monitor their Twitter accounts to predict potential future
attacks.
Although the sentiment-attack correlation analysis does
not cover all defacers, the fact that a significant portion of
defacers (24%) demonstrated such a correlation indicates that
the analysis is a useful tool for some defacers. For other
defacers, the major reason of the lack of observation of such a
correlation is due to insufficient data. If we can collect more
data about them from other platforms such as underground
forums/chat rooms and hacker-oriented OSN and instance
messaging groups, it may be possible to discover a similar
correlation.
C. TOPICAL ANALYSIS
Motivation behind defacement attacks can potentially be
revealed by topics defacers discuss with each other or a
defacer talks with others. For instance, if a defacer’s main
motivation of launching defacement attacks is about to
demonstrate his/her disagreement with some political move-
ment, then it is likely he/she will talk about this specific
political movement on Twitter.
To analyze what topics defacers were talking about on
Twitter, we applied the LDA-based topic modeling algorithm
[27] to the corpus of timelines of all the 96 defacers. A topical
modeling algorithm like LDA sees a document as a bag of
words and assumes that k topics (which is a set of words)
spread across all m documents in a corpus. In our context,
a document is a timeline of a defacer’s Twitter account (so
m = 100), and k is a parameter we need to set manually as the
input of the LDA algorithm. The main output of the algorithm
is a document to topic matrix, which shows what topics each
document includes. The LDA is an iterative algorithm that
requires another parameter r to be set: the maximum number
of iterations.
The topic number k was set to be 10 after several attempts
with different candidate values. For the parameter r , we var-
ied its value from 100 to 2,000 (incremented by 100), and
200 turned out to be the best value. The best values of k and r
were determined by examining the output topics and words
in these topics and comparing them with manual topical
modeling analysis results of some selected defacers.
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FIGURE 5. Some examples of comparison between the sentiment score and the attack frequency. Legend: blue
bars – sentiment score, red bars – attack frequency.
The LDA implementation in scikit-learn12 was used in this
experiment because of its wide usage in the machine learning
community.
The timelines were first preprocessed following a pipeline
including the steps below, and after that the results were feed
to the LDA algorithm:
• All tweets are translated to English using the Yandex
API in order to homogenize the dataset.
12https://scikit-learn.org/stable/index.html
• All URLs are removed because they can negatively
affect the topic analysis algorithm
• All words are converted to lowercase.
• The tokenize algorithm from gensim13 is applied
because of its ease of use. We also removed all punc-
tuation marks because they are irrelevant in term-based
topical modelling.
• Stopwords are eliminated using NLTK’s stopwords list.
• The lemmatization algorithm in TextBlob is applied.
13https://radimrehurek.com/gensim/
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FIGURE 6. Example topics and words belonging to the topics.
When examining the topical memberships of defacers,
we noticed that it is necessary to focus on top k ′ ≤ k topics
with a high probability. We observed that in general we do
not need to look at all k topics especially those with a small
probability, and that for some defacers using more than one
topics (e.g., the top 2 ones) can give a lot more useful infor-
mation than using just one. Two example are vurkacteam and
MahkuM_BeY, two hackers from Turkey with mild political
intentions. Their most dominating topic is one of the general
(i.e., less distinctive) topics (6c) but their second dominating
topic reflects their interest in Turkish politics (number 2).
Details about Topic 6 can be seen in Fig. 6b. Several examples
of the topics and their terms can be seen in Fig. 6.
Looking at the topics generated, three topical themes are
clearly visible: politics, country related, and technical discus-
sions. In total there are 5 politics-related topics. One of them
is about anti-Zionist movement whereas another one is about
Turkish politics. One such topic is about anti-government
discussions, and another is mainly following the hacker group
Anonymous on political matters. A third one includes ‘‘opsu-
dan’’ keyword, which is the hashtag for the Sudan operation
started by Anonymous, so a sub-topic about Anonymous.
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There are also topics relevant for specific countries.
We spotted 6 of them and some overlap with political topics.
Interestingly, defacers sharing similar scores of the dominat-
ing topics tend to be from the same country. Five countries
standout according to the topics generated by LDA: Turkey,
Brazil, Argentina, Iran, Tunisia. All the political topics also
include country-related words, which can be interpreted by
the fact that people from the same country tend to have shared
interests in political matters of their own country.
The last topical theme include discussions on technologies.
One 6e is about general cyber security terms, and some
example words are: ‘‘malware’’, ‘‘phishing’’, ‘‘breach’’ and
‘‘privacy’’. The other (Topic 1) has a web application security
flavor with example words such as ‘‘joomla’’, ‘‘wordpress’’,
‘‘cms’’, ‘‘injection’’, ‘‘plugin’’, ‘‘sql’’. Details about Topic
1 can be seen at Fig. 6a.
There are also two topics whose semantic meaning can-
not be easily determined. Example words from these top-
ics include ‘‘people’’, ‘‘love’’, ‘‘heart’’, ‘‘like’’, ‘‘make’’,
‘‘time’’, ‘‘feel’’, ‘‘know’’, ‘‘friend’’, ‘‘person’’. The words in
these two topics seem to have a flavor of showing negative
and positive feelings. They may be signs of emotions that
lead to defacement attacks or the result of successful attacks.
In Section V-B, we showed that different sentiment feelings
deduced from text may be related to attack frequency.
Another interesting finding is that the term ‘‘team’’ is
mostly used in country-related topics. This may indicate that
hacker groups are generally formed by people from the same
country. In total 9 out of the 10 topics include ‘‘team’’ as a
topical word.
The results shown above demonstrate that topic modeling
is a useful technique for analyzing defacers’ topical inter-
ests on Twitter, which can provide useful insights on under-
standing their motivations of launching defacement attacks
and may even provide clues for predicting impeding future
attacks. The analysis can be extended to other textual data
describing defacers’ discussions online, e.g., on other OSNs
or underground forums. It is also possible to use the same
technique to study victims of defacement attacks and other
types of hackers.
D. SUMMARY
In this section, we briefly summarize all the results we
reported above, echoing the three research questions listed in
Section III.
The answer to the first one is positive. Our results demon-
strated that graph analysis based on OSN data is a good
method to gain a richer insight into defacers’ social structures
online. Particularly, our results revealed that it may be possi-
ble to detect unknown hacker groups or previously unknown
members of a known hacker group using the OSN graph
analysis.
The answer to the second research questions is also posi-
tive. Our results showed that at least for some defacers their
online sentiment status are indeed correlated with the fre-
quency of actual defacement attacks launched, which offers
a possible approach to generate early warnings or even
pre-attack alerts.
The last research question is about topics defacers dis-
cussed on Twitter so that we can achieve a better understand-
ing on their motivation. Our results demonstrated that topical
modelling is a useful technique to study defacers’ topical
interests and politics emerged as one of main topical themes
(which was not a surprise since many reported defacement
attacks were driven by political tension between nations).
While this paper focuses on defacers’ activities on Twitter,
we believe some of the results are generalizable to other types
of hackers and some could be used to study victims of cyber
attacks, too.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
This paper reports the first OSN-based behavioral analysis of
defacers using their activities on Twitter and data on deface-
ment attack archiving websites. A range of computational
data analytic techniques were used to conduct the analysis,
including graph-based analysis of defacers and their friends
on Twitter, NLP-based sentiment analysis and correlation
analysis between defacers’ sentiment statuses and their attack
frequencies, and NLP-based topical modelling analysis of
defacers’ discussions on Twitter. The results proved that such
computational analysis can help reveal important insights
about defacers’ motivations and behavioral patterns, and even
providing hints for predicting future defacement attacks (e.g.,
by monitoring known defacers’ sentiment status on Twitter)
and unknown defacers (e.g., via clustering analysis of known
defacers’ networks of friends).
The work reported in this paper can be improved in a
number of ways, which will be our future work. The number
of defacers studied in this paper could be further increased
by looking at more data from more defacement archiving
websites and online attack monitoring services. We can also
extend the OSN platform covered from Twitter only to other
platforms including Facebook, underground online forums
and chat rooms, hacker-oriented OSN and instance messag-
ing groups.Withmore data, we could investigate more factors
that can influence defacers’ behaviors to gain deeper and
broader insights, e.g., to reveal correlation between sentiment
scores and attack frequencies for more defacers. In addi-
tion, we will explore a more automated method for the
sentiment-attack correlation analysis, e.g., using a mathemat-
ical definition of the correlation and a supervised machine
learning algorithm to automatic profile defacers and predict
future defacement attacks from a specific defacer or a specific
group of defacers. More advanced sentiment analysis and
topical modelling techniques could be tried to achieve a bet-
ter understanding of defacers’ behaviors. Our work focused
more on English textual analysis by translating non-English
tweets to English using an automated translation service.
Using NLP tools that can directly process non-English texts
will help reduce errors introduced by automated translation
and cover semantic meanings that otherwise will be lost
during the translation process. In addition, some empirical
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studies such as interviews and surveys of defacers could also
help validate some of the findings in the papers, in order to
provide some level of ‘‘ground truth’’.
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